Survival in Death by Common Disaster by Wislizenus, Frederick A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 1 
January 1921 
Survival in Death by Common Disaster 
Frederick A. Wislizenus 
St. Louis Bar Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frederick A. Wislizenus, Survival in Death by Common Disaster, 6 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 001 (1921). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 




vol, vi Published by the Undergraduates of theWashington University School of Law 1o. I
SURVIVAL IN DEATH BY CO)MION DISASTER.
When property rights depend on the relative time of the
death of persons, and there is no direct evidence to determine
the order of such deaths, the law must have some criterion
for adjudication of such rights. To take a simple illustration:
Father and son, sole members of the immediate family, go
together to sea in a vessel that is not heard of after departure.
Considering disposition of the father's estate, if the son sur-
vived, it went to him, and on his subsequent death to his heirs,
which might be relatives on his mother's side. But if the son
died before the father, the estate would go to the relatives
of the latter, necessarily excluding relatives of the mother
of that son.
In the case of conflicting claim to such a father's estate
between claimants on the theory that the son had survived,
against those who asserted the prior demise of the son, the
decision will be wholly governed by the ruling as to where
the burden of proof rests, and in the assumed absence of all
evidence, that question can only be settled by a presumption
of law. It will not do to simply say that the burden rests on
those who are forced into a court as plaintiffs to assert their
claims. This would leave those who happened to hold any
property of the deceased in a position where they could suc-
cessfully resist all claimants on either theory for want of
direct evidence of survivorship, one way or the other, essen-
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tial for either claim. The presumption must go further; it
must in some way lay down a rule by which the succession
rights to property of persons perishing in a common disaster
is determined. The law cannot leave the property to the first
occupant which it virtually would do, if it declared itself
unable to settle the conflict.
The Roman law, largely followed by modern Europe, in-
dulges in presumptions of survivorship by tests depending
on age and sex of the lives involved. They are somewhat
elaborate and are supposed to cover every imaginable situa-
tion. It is not necessary to mention them all. It will be
enough to illustrate by the rule that a person between fifteen
and sixty years of age is assumed to have survived one below
or above that limit. Viewing such cases in the mass, it is
pretty clear, under human experience, that in a heavy pre-
ponderance of them the presumption would meet the actual
facts, if we could know them, though in any single case, con-
sidered by itself, it may seem an attenuated ground for set-
tling property rights. Thus, the Roman law, recognizing the
logical necessity of some decisive presumptions, adopts the
best it can find based on human experience as furnishing a
test easily applicable in all cases, and as producing results
which accord in most of the cases with the facts undiscover-
able by direct evidence. It is not perfect, but it is the best
that can be done.
English and American law repudiates these presumptions
of the Roman law as unsubstantial and fanciful. The pro-
priety of that course of our law is here called in question, as
are many of the results reached under our system.
It is said in most of our cases that there is no presump-
tion one way or the other as to survivorship. But this does
not mean that the court would have to throw out both sets
of claimants as being incapable of passing on their respective
rights owing to total want of proof (or presumptions). A
definite decision is made under our theory as well as under
that of the Roman law. If the court is to act at all, there is,
in the absence of evidence, an iron necessity for some pre-
sumption.
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Illustrating by the above mentioned simple case of death
of father and son in shipwreck, the court in distributing the
father's estate would say: There is no presumption that the
son survived the father, hence those claiming through the son
have no interest in the father's estate, which goes clearly to
the father's distributees. In other words, the estate is dis-
tributed as if the son had died before the father. However,
there is no general legal presumption that the son died before
the father, as is clear when we consider distribution of the
son's estate. Here the father, if he survived, would have
taken the whole estate, but there is no presumption of the
father's survivorship, so the estate is distributed as if the
father had died before the son. The only possible reconcile-
ment of these conflicting presumptions, or, if you will, ab-
sence of presumptions, in the cases of the father's and son's
estates is the presumption that neither survived the other;
that both died at precisely the same moment. That this is
the actual position of our law is freely admitted in several
well considered cases.
While death of both at the same instant is possible, it is
certainly very exceptional. Thus we reject the Roman pre-
sumption, based on a balance of probabilities, as fanciful, but
decide succession rights on the presumption of a fact which
we know is false, save under extraordinary circumstances.
First, proclaiming that there is no presumption whatever,
,ignoring that there can in the nature of things be no decision
of the situation without some presumption, we finally assume,
as our test for distribution, a state of facts that is barely
possible. As a logical matter the standpoint of our courts
on this topic does not seem impressive.
We have as yet taken into consideration only the simplest
situation, where the conflicting claims depended on inheritance
in case of intestacy. However capricious and inadequate to
justice our English theory, that all the deaths involved oc-
curred at the same instant of time, may be, it at least fur-
nishes a definite solution of easy application.
But the question of survivorship must often be determined
when the right to the property involved depends on some
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written document. It may be the construction of a Will or
deed, or of some form of insurance. Here the first step is to
determine where the burden of proof rests under the provi-
sions of that document, and the result may depend on quite
accidental phrasing.
To illustrate in wills: Suppose the will of X, long since
dead, had devised realty to A in fee, provided that if B sur-
vived A, the title should devolve to B in fee. Let A and B
die with no evidence as to which survived the other. The
solution here is clear, as in the case of intestacy. The claim-
ants under B must establish the fact that B survived A, and
as they fail to do so, the property remains with A's heirs
or devisees. Let us now suppose the testator, instead of the
provision as above, had devised the property to A for life
with remainder to B in fee, provided, however, that if B died
before A, then A should take the fee. Here A's heirs have a
right to the fee only in the event that they show affirmatively
that B died before A. Since they cannot make that showing,
and the English law presumes that A and B died together,
so that B did not die before A, B's heirs take to the exclu-
sion of A's. In both forms of the will the intent was the
same. A form of expression that may be called almost ad-
ventitious results in changing the burden of proof. The con-
flicting judgments under the two forms of gift rest on artifi-
cial reasoning. The mind refuses to accept as just these con-
flicting results turning on the verbal form of gifts that in
substance are identical. Under the Roman law the presump-
tion based on preponderance of probabilities in the average
would have definitely determined whether A or B survived.
The question of burden of proof would not have to be exam-
ined, and the result would be the same under either form of
will.
When the conflict arises between claimants as beneficiaries
of insurance policies, there are, of course, all the questions
concerning construction of these policies that there are in the
case of wills. But additional factors complicate the problem.
If the insurance money is payable to "A if surviving the
insured, if not to B," then if A and the insured die together,
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the question as to the policy at first blush seems the same
that would have arisen under the identical provision of a
will. But in these two cases, before the death of the testator
or the insured, A's relation to the will may be very different
from his relation to the policy, from which difference oppos-
ing results may follow. Under the will during the testator's
life, A has no rights whatever; nothing but an expectancy
which the testator may terminate at his discretion. A's right
begins at the testator's death under the terms of the will;
that right depends on the fulfillment of the condition. If
that cannot be shown (or presumed), A's right never attaches.
In the case of an insurance policy however, under the holding
in most states, the named beneficiary has a vested right, when
the policy issues, of which he can be deprived only by his
consent, or under the provisions of the policy. In such state
of the law it is possible, perhaps even plausible, to interpret
clauses in varying language to the effect that if A, the first
named beneficiary, does not survive the insured, then the
fund shall go to B, as being a mere provision for divestiture
of the vested rights of A. The condition is not precedent to
the vesting of A's rights, as it clearly would be in a will; but
subsequent to the acquisition of a vested right, which is good
unless the event which defeats that right is shown. On this
theory under identical language the claimants under the named
beneficiary, whose survivorship cannot be determined, fail in
the case of a will, but recover in the case of an insurance
policy. Mere common sense, when not aided by the dark lan-
tern rays of technicality, will see but little reason for such a
distinction. It must be added that many, if not most, cases
repudiate or ignore the distinction, which, however, has firm
lodgment in the decisions. Nor is our appreciation of law
as based on inherent natural justice strengthened when we
learn that the ruling concerning insurance applies only to
strict insurance, and does not apply when the policy is issued
by a fraternal organization. In the latter case, as is held
generally - perhaps without exception - the insured can
change the beneficiary at will, and the named beneficiary has
no vested interest, as in regular insurance.
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This distinction is well illustrated in two Missouri cases.
Harry 0. Yocum and his daughter, Florence, perished with
all aboard on his yacht in the Gulf of Mexico. Mr. Yocum
had regular insurance on his life payable to "Miss Florence
Yocum, if surviving, if not, to the legal representatives of
the insured." He was also insured in the Royal Arcanum,
a benevolent organization. There he also named his daugh-
ter as the beneficiary and the laws of the order (a part of
the contract) provided that in the event of the death of the
beneficiary (Miss Yocum) before the decease of the member
(Mr. Yocum), the insurance should be paid to relatives in
an order fixed by those rules. The regular insurance case
between Miss Yocum's representatives and her father's was
decided in favor of those claiming under the daughter, on
reasoning above given (U. S. Casualty v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301.).
Subsequently the Royal Arcanum case reached the Court of
Appeals (Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 M. A. 93) and was
there decided in favor of the nieces of Mr. Yocum and against
the claimants through Miss Yocum, i. e., against those claim-
ing on the theory, of her survivorship. The thoughtful and
valuable opinion of the Court of Appeals specifically points
out that it in no wise conflicts with the prior opinion of the
Supreme Court. It is fairly clear that if Mr. Yocum had left
a will worded like the regular insurance, the representatives
of the daughter would not have taken, in contrast with the
insurance case, and in harmony with the Royal Arcanum case.
Here, too, the authorities are not unanimous. In the re-
cent Arkansas case of Watkins v. Insurance Co., 208 S. W.
577, the Court recognized that the interest of the named bene-
ficiary, who died with the insured, was not vested, but held,
nevertheless, that he had such interest as gave him a prima
facie right, which threw on those contesting his right the
burden of proving that the beneficiary died before the insured,
which could not be done. So the representative of the first
named beneficiary recovered in direct conflict with the ruling
in the last mentioned Missouri case.
There are other complications. For instance, there may
be successive beneficiaries, as, to the wife, if she survives,
if not, to the children. Under our law, if the wife cannot be
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shown to have survived, the children take. But suppose the
whole family, husband, wife and children, die together. Do
the representatives of the children still take, or does the fund
go to the estate of the deceased father and husband, as cre-
ator of this trust, on the theory that none of the beneficiaries
can make out a case? There is no direct decision and the
reasoning of the courts would lead to conflicting results.
It is not in the scope of this article to discuss such ques-
tions. The suggestion of some of the intricacies to which our
system leads is made as argument for the propriety of adopt-
ing something like the Roman law doctrine of presumptions
which cuts under all such troubles.
The English and American doctrine as to survivorship,
which in form repudiates all presumptions and by the logic
of necessity acts on the absurd presumption that the parties
involved died at the same instant, not only establishes an
arbitrary rule which has no relation to natural justice, but
it furthermore forces a technical investigation as to the bur-
den of proof, turning often on meticulous examination of
words or phrases which were used in wills, deeds or contracts
with no thought of application to the facts in controversy.
Such a solution of a difficult situation is not immoral, but is
unmoral. The result in a given case may be right or wrong,
as it would be if the determination were by throw of dice.
In both cases the method of reaching the conclusion is want-
ing in ethical elements.
The presumptions of the Roman law, resting on human
experience, give us the consolation of feeling that in the great
majority of cases the finding must correspond with the un-
ascertainable fact. The method has at least the merit of
deciding the case on a positive finding as to the crucial fact.
Moreover, by thus going to the root of the matter in definitely
fixing the survivorship, one way or the other, it dispenses
with that examination of hair-splitting discriminations con-
cerning burden of proof which so much complicate these cases
under our system. Under these Roman law presumptions,
either A died first, or B died first. The fact is before the
court, however it got there, and from that fact the decision
follows.
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Presumptions, of course, have their place only in the total
absence of evidence as to the order in time of the deaths in-
volved. Thus in Will of Abram Ehle, 73 Wis. 445, a lone
farm house was consumed with all its inmates, three genera-
tions of one family. Examination of the ruins, with the loca-
tion of the bodies, and other surrounding circumstances, sat-
isfied the court as to the order of the deaths without occasion
for any presumptions.
Where there is such other evidence, the presumptions aris-
ing from age, sex and physical condition, though in them-
selves inadequate, may be used to eke out the case.
"Considerations of age, sex, etc., are resorted to in con-
nection with other circumstances as a matter of evidence from
which a certain conclusion may be legitimately inferred."
Smith v. Groom, 7 Fla. 81, 1. c. 144.
Indeed, it may be noted that the courts in a few cases
have shown an inclination in cases of strong contrast in the
condition of the lives involved to give effect to mere pre-
sumptions. Thus in Caye v. Leach, 8 Met. 371, the Court
said it might if required presume that a grandfather had
survived his grandchild of tender years, but declined to pre-
sume that the intervening generation, the daughter of that
man and mother of that infant, had survived her f'ather, then
seventy years of age, which was the vital point in the case.
But such obiter remarks, of which there are but few, cannot
be considered as materially affecting the established holding
that our law rejects these presumptions of the Roman law.
A few selected cases will illustrate the results brought
about under our law, and the trouble in arriving at them.
In Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan. 276, a night flood of a creek
drowned a woman with the two infant children of her first
marriage. Mother and children owned in varying interest
realty derived from the first husband. If the mother sur-
vived the children, all interest in the realty would vest in
her, and on her death pass to her second husband. If either
child survived the mother, the whole interest would have
vested in the mother of that mother, grandmother of the sur-
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viving child. The decision, on the basis that all died at the
same moment, awards the mother's interest to the second
husband and that of the children to the grandmother. This
may be fair as the award of an extrajudicial arbitrator,
but is unsatisfactory as a legal proposition. In fact, either
mother or children survived and the property should go as
a whole accordingly.
In Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 111, one W. Jr. with his
three children left Scotland for Havana in February, 1880.
The vessel was never heard of after departure. If W. Jr.
died after all his children, W. Sr., his father, was his sole
heir. Believing himself such heir, the father quitclaimed his
son's realty to the defendant in the case in September, 1880.
If W. Jr. was then dead, the deed passed title; if not, the
deed conveyed nothing. On the theory that the survival of
the children could not be shown, the right of those claiming
through them was not allowed; but, on a doctrine not bear-
ing on our present topic, the Court found that the son might
be presumed to be dead in six months after leaving Scotland,
so making his father his heir, and validating the quitclaim
deed given by him in September. The presumptions of the
Roman law would have led to the same result.
Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S.
401, well illustrates the uncertainties that may arise from
the phraseology of a will. In that case the testatrix be-
queathed her property to her son with an income therefrom
to her husband for life. Then follows the provision that in
the event of the death of the son before the decease of either
the testatrix or her husband, the property shall go to a
trustee for the husband for life, and then to the Home; in
the event that the testatrix should become the survivor of
both husband and son, then to the Home. The husband died
first; and then mother and son together at sea without any-
thing to determine which survived the other. The claimants
were the Home, as ultimate beneficiary, those entitled if the
son had survived, and the representatives of the testatrix on
the theory that no case could be made out for any claimant
under the will. The court of first instance awarded the
property to the Home. The appellate court (18 App. D. 0. 9)
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gave it to the representatives of the son, and the U. S. Su-
preme Court (187 U. S. 401) rendered the final decision for
the Home. For the son it was contended as against the
Home that under the terms of the will the Home could not
take until it showed that the son had died before the mother.
For the mother's distributees it was further claimed that
the claimants under the son must show that he survived his
mother. It must be conceded, I think, that this interpreta-
tion is correct if we read the clauses merely in the strict
grammatical sense. The U. S. Supreme Court held that the
testatrix' intention could be deduced from the terms of the
will, though not put in express words, and that this intention
was that the Home should take if the prior provisions failed
from any cause. The discussion of Wing 'v. Angrave, 8 H. L.
183 (to be hereinafter mentioned), it seems to me, falls short
of showing that that English ruling on this matter of con-
struction is in accord with the holding in the Home case.
But that discussion does not properly fall within the limits
of this article. We refer to this Home case and hereafter to
the Wing case as showing how the burden of proof may be
shifted by construction resting on language which was drawn
without the event in view and therefore bearing on it only by
chance. Under the presumption of the Roman law, no such
question as to burden of proof would arise. The presump-
tion that the son survived the mother-which is in probable
accord with fact-would have cut out the need of discussion.
Newell v. Nichols, 12 Hun. 604. The wreck of the Schiller
in 1874 gave rise to this interesting litigation. Elizabeth
Walter died in 1870, leaving a will declaring several trusts,
of which we may limit ourselves to one. It was for her daugh-
ter Mary for life; at her death to heirs of her body then liv-
ing; in default thereof, to appointee of that daughter; in
default of such heirs of her body or such appointment, to
testator's heirs then living; and in default of such heirs to
designated legatees. There were trusts substantially similar
for son, for husband and of the residuum.
-Mrs. Walter left surviving her mother, her husband -and
two infant children, Mary and Joseph. All four perished in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol6/iss1/1
SURVIVAL IN DEATH BY COMMON DISASTER
the Schiller, without any evidence as to the order in which
death ensued. Under the foregoing provisions concerning
Mary's trust, the full interest would have gone at her death
to Joseph, if he survived, and on his death to his distributee.
In 12 Hun. 604, the ultimate remaindermen in the will were
given this trust estate on the ground that other claims were
rested on the allegation that one of the children survived the
other, which could not be proved. The Court of Appeals
fully endorsed that view (75 N. Y. 78), but its opinion is
worthy of special notice as dealing with a peculiar matter
of fact in the case. It is this: If the infant Joseph survived
the infant Mary, Joseph took absolutely the Mary trust, one-
fourth the estate, and on his death it went to his distributees.
If, on the other hand, Joseph died before Mary, then the
Joseph trust, which was also one-fourth of the estate, would
go to Mary absolutely, and on her death to her distributees.
But the distributees of Mary and of Joseph are obviously
the same persons; one-fourth of the estate, therefore, must
go to these distributees of the children, whichever of them
died first. The only logical (as distinguished from legal)
way of avoiding the result is to say that neither infant sur-
vived the other. The Court held that these distributees were,
nevertheless, entitled to nothing because neither of the claims
could, by itself, be established. The same conclusion was
reached in Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. 183, of which we speak
at the end of this article. Here the fact is noted that the
law rejects a claim established by logic which would be ac-
cepted by science and by general common sense.
A leading case of insurance is Fuller v. Linzee, 135 Mass.
468. Husband, wife and three children perished together at
sea. His life was insured first for his wife. Should she die
before him, the amount shall be payable to the children.
Linzee, as administrator of both husband and wife, collected
the insurance for whom it may concern, and is sued by those
claiming through the wife, claimants under children not being
in court. Since the wife's survivorship could not be shown,
the decision was adverse to those claiming through her, which
is enough to dispose of the case. But the Court goes further,
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holding that the claimants through the children must also
fail and that the husband is entitled to the estate as a result-
ing trust.
"Assuming that it can be determined in this proceeding
that no survivorship of any of the family after any other one
can be proved, and that it appears that no claim under the
policy can be sustained upon the right of the wife or of any
child, then we think that whatever beneficial interest remained
in the policy would be that resulting to the estate of the hus-
band, who had procured the policy and paid the premiums
and had an interest in the life insured."
In this case, if the wife survived, of course, she took. On
the other hand, if she died first, it would seem that the chil-
dren (or their estates) took, even though they did not survive.
There is at least no express condition for their survival. If
this be correct construction of the contract, either the wife
or children took. The ruling, in that view, rejects both claims,
one of them bound to be true save for the extravagant as-
sumption of death at the same precise moment, simply be-
cause it cannot be shown which of them is true.
McGown v:Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, is a recent case, arising
out of the destruction of the Lusitania. Mr. and Mrs. Tesson,
husband and wife, perished there together. His life was in-
sured, and the fund was payable upon his death to his widow,
if living; if not, then to his executors, administrators and
assigns. Mr. Tesson had the right to change his beneficiary
as he desired. On the general doctrine the fund went to the
administrator of the insured, as the survivorship of the wife
could not be established. The decision adverts to the Kacer
case, 169 Mo. 301, which distinguished between cases under
wills and under insurance policies, but says that it cannot
adopt the reasoning, and further points out that the wife's
right was not vested even under that authority, since Mr.
Tesson could change his beneficiary.
As pointed out in a prior paragraph, the Missouri Su-
preme Court in U. S. Casualty v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, dis-
tinguished claims under wills from those under insurance
policies on the ground that in the latter case the first named
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beneficiary had what partook of the nature of a vested in-
terest on issuance of the policy, and in the later case of
Supreme Council v. Kacer, 96 M. A. 93, the Court of Appeals
held that this ruling as to insurance policies did not apply to
fraternal organizations, since there the beneficiary's interest
was not vested. Males v. Woodman, 30 Tex. Div. App. 184,
makes the same ruling.
But the law is not finally settled as to fraternal organiza-
tions. In Watkins v. Insurance Co., 208 S. W. 587 (Arkansas),
a father named his son as beneficiary of insurance. The
policy provided:
"If any beneficiary shall die before the insured, the in-
terest of such beneficiary shall vest in the insured."
The father could change beneficiary at discretion. Father
and son together were shot from ambush and nothing indi-
cated which survived. The decision was in favor of those
claiming under the son as against those claiming under the
father. This was not rested on construction of the language
used in the policy, but on the holding that the named bene-
ficiary had an interest, though not a vested one, at the issu-
ance of the policy, sufficient to make out the prima facie case
for those claiming under him.
"True, the beneficiary has no vested interest, because the
insured can change the beneficiary. But it is an expectancy,
which ripens into an interest unless the insured makes a
change; and the burden of showing change is on those claim-
ing thereunder. In the absence thereof, the qualified interest
of the named beneficiary sustains his right."
This was a case of regular insurance where the insured
could change the beneficiary; but under this ruling the first
named beneficiary in all cases of fraternal insurance would
have a prima facie case, as would a fortiori be true of regui-
lar policies where the beneficiary could not be changed by
the insured.
In Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403, the insurance was in a
fraternal organization. The policy was primarily payable
to the wife. The regulations provided that if the named
beneficiary should die in the life time of the member, the
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payment should be made first, to the widow; next, to chil-
dren; next, to mother, etc. The insured, his wife and his
two children were swept down to death together by the Johns-
town flood. The decision is in favor of those claiming under
the wife.
"Mrs. Hoopes (the wife) was the beneficiary named in
the certificate. Her representative has a prima facie title
to the fund. That title can only be divested by evidence show-
ing that she died before her husband."
,Roman law Would have presumed that Mr. Hoopes sur-
vived his wife and children, so the fund would have gone to
his next relative, in this case, his sister.
In the foregoing paragraphs a few selected cases have
been stated with no attempt to solve the complicated ques-
tions there raised. That would only obscure the purpose,
which is to point out some of the intricate problems which
must arise under our doctrine of no presumptions as to sur-
vivorship; the conflict and confusion as to the rulings there-
under, and the fact that under this system property rights
are settled on technicalities remote from the real question,
leading to distinctions which have no ethical merits. With
this the simple working and substantial justice of the doc-
trine of presumptions is contrasted.
With this view, I cite one more striking illustration:
Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. 183, a leading authority decided
in 1860, in which five law lords participated.
In this case one John Tully by will left his property in
trust for his daughter, Mary Ann, for life; on her decease
for her children, to vest in them at the age of twenty-one;
should all children die before attaining twenty-one, then as
Mary Ann may by will direct; in default of that, to testator 's
brothers and sisters.
Mr. Tully died. Mary Ann married Mr. Underwood.
Mary Ann (Mrs. Underwood) made a will in execution of
the power under her father's will, leaving her property to
her husband, "and in case my husband should die in my life
time" to Win. Wing.
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Mr. Underwood also made a will leaving his property to
Win. Wing in trust for his wife absolutely, and "in case my
said wife shall die in my life time," in trust for the children,
and in case all of them died under twenty-one, to said Win.
Wing for his own use.
Underwood, his wife and their three children, under
twenty-one, perished at sea. One child, Catherine, survived
the rest of the family a few hours. It was impossible to
determine the order of death of the others by any evidence.
Taking Mrs. Underwood's property as derived under her
father's will, it is obviously under that father's will wholly
controlled by Mrs. Underwood's will, which was the execu,
tion of a power.
Under her will, the question is whether or not her hus-
band survived her. If he did, though only for a moment, his
wife's property passed to him absolutely, and its disposition
at death is governed by his will. If he died first, on the
other hand, Mr. Wing takes the property absolutely. In no
event do the Underwood children take directly in their own
right any part of their mother's property. They all died
under twenty-one and for that reason are excluded from
the estate under the provisions of both their father's and
their mother's will.
Turning then to Mr. Underwood's will, it is first to be
noted that it controls the disposition of the property he held
in his own right in any event; that it also controls the prop-
erty his wife owned only in the event he survived her; but
that if he did survive her, the disposition of the property
derived from her must be the same as of that which he owned
in his own right.
Under the will of Mr. Underwood, all his property went
to his wife, if she survived him; but if she died first (and
also all the children before attaining twenty-one--which lat-
ter event occurred in fact) then to Win. Wing.
It results:
A. As to Mrs. Underwood's property:
1. If she died first, her property passed to her husband,
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upon whose death it passed under his will, going to Mr. Wing
as shown below (B. 2).
2. If the husband died first, it went under the provisions
of Mrs. Underwood's will directly to Mr. Wing.
B. As to Mr. Underwood's property:
1. If he died before his wife, the property (his alone, of
course, in that case) went to his wife absolutely, in which
event it passed on her subsequent death, under her will (A. 2
above) to Mr. Wing absolutely.
2. If he died after his wife, then under the provisions of
his will the property, which in that event includes also what
came to him from his wife, inasmuch as she died before him
and all the children died before twenty-one, goes to Mr. Wing
absolutely.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that if Mr. Un-
derwood died first, Mr. Wing gets all the property of both
Mr. and Mrs. Underwood, and that if Mrs. Underwood died
first, Mr. Wing likewise gets both estates. A layman would
say it is utterly immaterial which died first. All the property
goes to Mr. Wing beyond question.
Limiting ourselves to consideration of the estate held by
Mrs. Underwood, it is true there is a formal difference as to
Mr. Wing's title dependent on the question of survivor-
ship. If Mr. Underwood died first, the property passed di-
rectly to Mr. Wing without passing through an administrator
and without liability for Mrs. Underwood's debts, for the
source of his right is Mr. Tully's will through the exercise by
Mrs. Underwood of the power given her. Whereas, if Mr.
Underwood survived, the property held by his wife became
part of his estate, and as such became liable for any debts
he might have, and so would come to Mr. Wing under the
terms of Mr. Underwood's will only at the end of adminis-
tration. But there is no suggestion anywhere that Mr. Un-
derwood left debts; indeed, surrounding facts indicate the
contrary. So while a technical difference in the title must
be acknowledged, it remains true in every practical sense that
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Mr. Wing should get the property whether the husband sur-
vived the wife or vice versa; in other words, he should get
it in any event.
The case of Wing v. Angrave, supra, was brought to de-
termine the rights of all claimants to the property given by
Mr. Tully to his daughter, Mrs. Underwood, by his will.
The Chancellor, Lord Campbell, was of opinion that the
clause in Mrs. Underwood's will, "in case my husband should
die in my life time" (then to Mr. Wing), should be liberally
interpreted, in accordance with the evident intent of the tes-
tatrix, as meaning that if the gift to the husband should sub-
stantially fail for any reason, then the property should go
to Wing (see Young Women's Christian Home v. French,
187 U. S. 401, supra) ; but all the other law lords rejected that
construction, and, following the reasoning as to absence of
presumption under our law, the decision awarded the prop-
erty to the brothers and sisters of Mir. Tully, the last bene-
ficiaries mentioned in his will.
Foregoing criticism of the construction of the will, we are
impressed with the result that Mr. Wing gets nothing, though
each of the law lords takes for granted that if Mr. Wing could
show that Mr. Underwood died first, the property would be
Mr. Wing's, and it would also be his if Mrs. Underwood died
first. But he could not recover on the theory that Mr. Un-
derwood died first because he couldn't establish that fact;
nor could lie recover on the theory that Mrs. Underwood died
first on account of inability to show that. As a result of in-
ability to show which of two events happened, he cannot re-
cover, even though one or the other must have happened,
and the property would go to him in either event. Can it
be true that our law excludes processes of reasoning that
the science of logic recognizes and common sense (in pro-
ceedings out of court) habitually employs? If A is true, C
is true; if B is true, C is true; but either A or B is true; then
C is true. It is immaterial to inquire whether A or B is true,
since one or the other is true, and that involves the truth of C.
That reasoning has stood since Euclid's day. A stream di-
vides into two arms which reunite further down. An article
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placed in the stream above that division is found floating
below the junction. The inference is that the object floated
down the stream, though we have nothing to tell us which
branch it took. Nor does it seem that in that case in court
the result, as between the parties to the litigation, should be
affected by the consideration that if Mr. Wing claims through
Mr. Underwood, he receives the property only at the end of
administration, whereas if Mr. Underwood died first, Mr.
Wing gets it directly without administration. In either case
it ultimately reaches him. In one arm of the stream above
supposed, let us assume there was a millrace. If our object
placed in the stream above the division is found floating
below the junction, our conclusion is not weakened by our
inability to determine whether or not it passed through the
millrace. At most, to protect possible rights of Mr. Under-
wood's creditors, if any, Mr. Wing should be called on to
recognize those claims as binding on the estate coming to
him through Mrs. Underwood. This is only a formality, for
Mr. Underwood's own estate is clearly solvent.
But query as to the correctness of the holding in this
particular is collateral to our main thesis. The concurrent
view of four lawyers of such professional standing may well
make us pause. Admit they are right, as well may be. The
overshadowing matter, of general interest, is an amazed con-
templation of how far the so-called absence of presumption
as to survivorship leads us into intricate logical channels
through which no ethical currents circulate. The technical
process may end in a result which not only makes no appeal
to our sense of natural justice, but may run directly counter
to it. That is -ihat occurred in this Wing case. Each and
all the judges regret that legal rules, as they see it, prohibt
them from awarding the property to Wing. They acknowl-
edge the result in the special case to be wrong.
Under Roman law the case would have been simple. Un-
der the facts of the case, a presumption would have deter-
mined that the husband survived the wife. The result, giving
the property to Wing, would follow. There would have been
no discussion as to burden of proof, or as to showing a right
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through alternative sources. What is said of Wing v. An-
grave applies to the similar case of Newell v. Nichols, 75
N. Y. 78, above stated.
The subject of this article is the ethical and practical de-
sirability-perhaps it might be said the necessity-of intro-
ducing into our law presumptions as to survivorship analo-
gous to those of the Roman law. This case of Wing v. An-
grave might serve as a text.
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